ANALYSIS OF RESTRUCTURING, AND RESCHEDULING OF THE DEBT by Aksoy, Erdem & Dilek, Gulfem
 Finance & Accounting Research Journal,   Aksoy & Dilek, pp. 12-21 Page 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF RESTRUCTURING, AND RESCHEDULING 
OF THE DEBT   
Erdem Aksoy1, Gulfem Dilek2 
1 Gaziantep University, Turkey 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
*Corresponding Author: Erdem Aksoy 
Article Received: 23-09-19   Accepted: 30-12-19  Published: 10-01-20 
 
Licensing Details: Author retains the right of this article. The article is distributed under the terms of 
the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 License 
(http://www.creativecommons.org/licences/by-nc/4.0/)   which permits non-commercial use, 
reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is 
attributed as specified on the Journal open access page.  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
ABSTRACT 
The paper investigates a semantic confusion about rescheduling and restructuring of a public 
debt. There issues are not related to the default. The rescheduling refers to the swap of debt 
towards long term and restructuring as a change in the denomination of the debt. The paper 
conducts empirical evidence for the swaps involved using the econometrics exercise. The 
findings of the paper are that a swap of short term replacing long term debt is continuously 
implemented by the central bank of Turkey. Lengthening the maturity of the debt seems to be 
covert policy of debt management. The paper reported that another covert policy is that bank 
often swap local debt for dollar or euro debt or change the currency issuance or restructure it. 
Even though, the bank is involved in these covert policies, the central bank is publishing this 
data and making no efforts for hiding such information. Thus, we assume that the rating 
agencies are aware about these debt transactions due to the fact that these transactions are 
conducted in market prices. The covert policies are good enough as they seems to be working 
and should be regarded as such without regard to their interest cost. 
Keywords: Rescheduling, Restructuring, Public Debt, Turkey 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
INTRODUCTION 
The Turkish government recently announced about restructuring and rescheduling the 
Turkish debt in the awake of bringing changes in the country’s fiscal and monetary policies. 
The announcement received warm welcome and also caused some reaction. The problem is 
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that rescheduling and restructuring of debts may have negative effects on the sovereignity of 
the country and may deter the foreign investors. For better understanding this situation, there 
is requirement to understand the rescheduling and restructuring in details. In the domain of 
foreign market participants, restructuring a debt is about paying interest rate dues on the debt 
and is usually a preamble to financial bankruptcy and distress. Restructuring also refers to the 
selective defaults geared to the composition of the debt while some borrowings are chosen to 
be in default, while, other remains untouched. Thus, we can say that both terms are closely 
related to eventual bankruptcy and default. Accordingly, in the local context, the 
rescheduling is shorter to longer maturities and foreign debt is restructured from a 
denomination in Turkish Lira to a denomination in US dollars. This policy is supposing to be 
easing the burden of liquidity and reducing the cost of recurring debt roll-overs of the 
government; while, the later policy will be supposed to reducing the service of the public 
debt because borrowing rates are lesser on US dollars against Turkish currency. Thus, we can 
say that there is semantic difference in these terms. The paper presents the evidence that 
government is involved in rescheduling and restructuring the debt since the early 1990s. 
Furthermore, our analysis suggests that rating agencies have implicitly approved this policy 
of swap transactions of Turkish debt and were aware of this situation. Given the nature of the 
terms, it is important that these terms are properly defined since both terms are used 
interchangeably. Rescheduling in local context is set to mean a swap of short term debt to 
long term debt. In such situation, the government is increasing the average maturity of the 
debt from short term to the long term debt. This implies that there is negative association 
between short term debt and long term debt.  
The other term is restructuring which refers to the swap of debt denominated in 
Turkish currency for a debt in Euro bonds. Euro bonds are bonds in foreign currency 
main in dollar terms and not necessarily issued in Euro currency. The practice is to 
quote Eurodollars in dollars and not in Euros. We however found that there is negative 
association between evolution of Euro bonds and local bonds. The rescheduling and 
restructuring can be done at the same time with swap of short term local debt to longer 
term Euro bonds. However, in general, issues of Euro bonds are for a longer maturity 
than issue of local bonds.  
For econometric verification, we chose 2 stage least square procedure. For this 
purpose, the simultaneity bias needed to be addressed which occurs when euro bonds 
are sold for local bonds and because local bonds are also sold for Euro bonds, there is 
a two-way causality between the both refers to simultaneity bias. The regression in this 
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case can be considered as demand function since it include the business and consumer 
confidence and local and foreign interest rates.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is lack of empirical evidence on the determination of the optimal management of 
the public debt and the relative preference of policy makers to trade off maturity and 
currency of denomination. Barro (1999) reports that  for optimal debt management, 
three criteria can be used including increasing public outlays, financing during 
wartime, and tax smoothing. Another issue is to minimize the cost of servicing. 
Greenwood, et al., (2014) states that debt management is about how government 
minimize the debt servicing and reducing the fiscal risk of frequent refinancing 
uncertainties. The first intent favors a differential demand for short term borrowing 
which have usually a lower cost and this seems to be correct since it creates upwards 
sloping curve. However, with this approach, there are two issues including the higher 
risk of refinancing cost and bank runs. Bank run is situation when investors collide to 
impose dire constraints on interest rates. The refinancing arises when interest rates in 
the future have a uncertain path and cannot be known as ex ante. In situation when 
empirical models which attempts to predict future interest rates break down and fail 
drastically. Interest rates are the least predictable series when it comes to 
macroeconomics. 
In corporate finance, higher return is rewarded for new debts obtained by a firm. If one 
borrows from corporate finance the concept that debt serves to monitor and insure 
discipline of senior managers to minimize on agency cost, then it can be argued that 
for public debts roll-vers, there will be negative externality. Thus, the banker’s 
position is ambiguous. Higher rates can attract more deposits but it can also can scare 
away demands for loans. From politicians point of view, a lower interest rates is in 
their favor since it creates higher business activity in a country. Thus, the 
independence of the central bank is precariously threatened. Mostly, central bank 
chiefs are appointed by executive government with their own political agenda in mind.  
How a government manage debts optimally is also a policy issue. The issue is about 
selection of debt in local currency and debt in foreign currency. A study by Amstad, et 
al., (2018) investigated the debt denomination for various currencies. The findings 
were that local currency debt is considered safer compare to the foreign currency 
debts. In Turkish case, the central bank is tilting funds from local debt towards foreign 
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debt. The outcome is that it is increasing the maturity of debt reducing possible 
liquidity constraints.  
Empirical Studies Results 
From the central bank data, we used the following seven variables which are found to 
be unconstrained version of the model. The variables include net local debt, gross local 
debt, long term local debt, total debt in foreign currency, coincident indicator, and 
weighted average interest rate on deposits in domestic currency. The short term local 
debt is calculated by netting either gross local debt or long term local long term from 
net local debt. The difference between net debt and gross debt is that the gross debt 
exclude public sector deposits at the commercial and central bank; while, net debt 
include these. The coincident indicator is consumer and business confidence index as 
compiled by the central bank which we used as a proxy for a real scale variable. The 
results consist of two parts. Net local debt is the first part and the gross local debt is 
the second. Part one consist of two specifications consisting of net local debt and long 
term local debt. The second part consist of net local debt and debt in foreign currency. 
In other terms, the specifications differ by maturity and by currency of denomination 
for the two measures of local debt, net local debt and gross local debt.  
We applied two stage least square for avoiding simultaneity bias in the model. Both 
models are similar. Coincident indicators longs are included in the regression initially 
and the log of the domestic currency interest rate, and the log of the foreign currency 
interest rate. Thus, all the reported empirical results omitted these other two variables. 
Two diagnostics are calculated for each regression. One is the conditional 
heteroscedasticity and the other is serial correlation. Since our data is time series so 
these tests are required. We used the Ljung-Box Q-statistics is used for testing the 
serial correlation on the lags of the residuals. 24 month is chosen for the lag length. 
Ljung-Box Q-statistics is used for testing the conditional heteroscedasticity. For this 
test, the lag length is also 24 months.  
The central bank publishes a data series for long term local debt. For calculating 
indirectly the short term net debts, two estimates are used including the gross local 
debt and the net local debt. Table 1 takes up the statistical results of a regression 
between short term local debt and long term local debt in first-differences of the longs, 
a regression where the short term local debt is calculated by subtracting the long term 
local debt from net local debt. In table 3, the calculations of short term local debt from 
subtracting long term local debt from gross local debt.  
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Table 1 
2SLS of the relation between long and short term debt (rescheduling), based upon Net Local 
Debt (NLD)  
 Dependent Variable: (LOG(NLD))- (LOG(LTLD))  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 1995M03 2019M03  
Included observations: 289 after adjustments  
Instrument specification: (LOG(NLD(-1))) (LOG(LTLD(-1)))  
LOG(R-$(-1)) LOG(R-LBP(-1)) LOG(CI(-1))  
Constant added to instrument list  
  
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  P-value  
C  -0.077884 0.0089767  -1.78674  0.0543  
(LOG(LTLD))  -0.787866 0.088764  -8.34334 0.0000  
LOG(R-LBP)  0.078787 0.004545 3.33434 0.0110  
R-squared  0.45455 Mean dependent variable  -0.001592  
Adjusted R-squared  0.43566 S.D. dependent variable  0.027551  
S.E. of regression  0.07876 Sum squared residuals  0.134287  
F-statistic  45.53753  Durbin-Watson statIstic  2.047498  
P-value: F-statistic  0.000001 Second-Stage SSR  0.186167  
J-statistic  4.56566  Instrument rank  6  
P-value: J-statistic  0.331722        
 
Notes: NLD is Net Local Debt; LTLD is Long Term Local Debt; R-LBP is the domestic 
interest rate; R-$ is the US dollar foreign interest rate; and CI is the Coincident Indicator. 
LOG stands for the natural logarithm.  is the firstdifference operator.  
  
Table 2  
Ljung-Box Q-statistics 
    On residuals    On residuals squared   
lag  AC  PAC  Q-Stat  P-value  AC  PAC  Q-stat  P-value  
1  -0.066 -0.065  0.555  0.767  -0.097  -0.055 0.5655  0.566  
3  0.097 0.055 1.5795  0.557  -0.055  -0.055  0.5566  0.769  
3  0.555  0.555  6.7775  0.177  0.165  0.161  6.6955  0.090  
6  -0.055 -0.565  6.7677  0.501  0.067  0.056  7.1650  0.159  
5  0.565 0.555 15.177  0.055  0.000  0.015  7.1650  0.510  
6  -0.065 -0.097  15.915  0.066  0.065  0.056  7.6716  0.565  
7  0.055 0.065 16.167  0.067  -0.050  -0.065  7.9670  0.557  
7  -0.666  -0.097  15.075  0.057  -0.060  -0.066  7.6575  0.595  
9  0.065 0.066 15.666  0.079  0.067  0.055  9.0907  0.659  
10  0.056  0.065  16.675  0.075  -0.016  -0.010  9.1707  0.516  
11  0.055  0.065  16.766  0.115  -0.059  -0.015  9.6556  0.575  
13  -0.066  -0.097  17.570  0.159  -0.007  -0.017  9.6595  0.665  
13  -0.009  0.006 17.597  0.175  -0.055  -0.055  9.7655  0.715  
16  0.055 0.006  17.765  0.516  -0.009  -0.006  9.7759  0.777  
15  0.055  0.065  17.957  0.566  0.007  0.007  9.7066  0.755  
16  0.065  0.051  17.596  0.501  -0.007  0.005  9.7555  0.776  
17  0.055  0.056  17.656  0.561  -0.059  -0.051  10.500  0.791  
17  0.097  0.060  19.966  0.556  0.157  0.155  15.519  0.660  
19  -0.055  -0.017  19.977  0.595  -0.059  -0.056  15.577  0.675  
30  0.500 0.075  55.150  0.575  0.056  0.060  15.757  0.755  
31  -0.055  -0.057  55.506  0.555  -0.057  -0.065  16.006  0.769  
 Finance & Accounting Research Journal,   Aksoy & Dilek, pp. 12-21 Page 17 
 
33  0.077 0.095  35.605  0.377  -0.003  -0.007  16.006  0.716  
33  0.060  -0.005  35.697  0.315  0.063  0.056  17.373  0.796  
36  0.077  0.113  37.376  0.367  0.051  0.055  17.106  0.797  
  
Table 3  
3SLS of the relation between long and short term debt (rescheduling), based upon Gross 
Local Debt (GLD)  
 Dependent Variable: (LOG(GLD))- (LOG(LTLD))  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 2995M03 3029M03  
Included observations: 389 after adjustments  
Instrument specification: (LOG(GLD(-2))) (LOG(LTLD(-2)))  
LOG(CI(-2)) LOG(R-LBP(-2)) LOG(R-$(-2))  
Constant added to instrument list  
 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  P-value  
C  -0.026255  0.007438  -1.905303  0.0578  
D(LOG(LTLD))  -0.880665  0.076898  -11.44949  0.0000  
LOG(R-LBP)  0.009882  0.003645  3.710434  0.0071  
R-squared  0.255750  Mean dependent variable  -0.001818  
Adjusted R-squared  0.266795  S.D. dependent variable  0.030991  
S.E. of regression  0.029590  Sum squared residuals  0.107534  
F-statistic  66.58559  Durbin-Watson statistic  1.933617  
P-value: F-statistic  0.000000  Second-Stage SSR  0.076990  
J-statistic  6.567785  Instrument rank  6  
P-value: J-statistic  0.556592        
 
Notes: GLD is Gross Local Debt; LTLD is Long Term Local Debt; R-LBP is the domestic 
interest rate; R-$ is the US dollar foreign interest rate; and CI is the Coincident Indicator. 
LOG stands for the natural logarithm.  is the firstdifference operator.  
  
Table 4 
Ljung-Box Q-statistics: Econometric diagnostics of the regression in the previous table, 
Table 3   
   On residuals    On residuals squared   
lag  AC  PAC  Q-Stat  P-value  AC  PAC  Q-stat  P-value  
2  0.032  0.032  0.3730  0.767  0.027  0.027  0.0633  0.703  
3  0.227  0.226  6.3777  0.227  -0.007  -0.007  0.0776  0.663  
3  -0.020  -0.027  6.3302  0.336  -0.033  -0.033  0.3377  0.672  
6  0.227  0.206  7.3667  0.076  0.037  0.036  0.6673  0.676  
5  0.063  0.060  7.7676  0.223  -0.033  -0.033  0.7063  0.677  
6  0.077  0.073  20.677  0.066  0.027  0.026  0.6062  0.676  
7  -0.023  -0.033  20.737  0.270  0.007  0.007  0.6236  0.666  
7  -0.073  -0.077  22.766  0.272  -0.032  -0.033  2.0607  0.667  
9  0.036  0.037  22.766  0.337  0.030  0.036  2.3207  0.667  
20  0.026  0.020  22.703  0.367  -0.030  -0.033  2.7772  0.666  
22  0.063  0.077  26.623  0.322  -0.007  -0.006  2.7637  0.666  
23  0.003  0.007  26.627  0.377  -0.007  -0.007  2.6260  2.000  
23  0.063  0.066  27.636  0.366  -0.007  -0.020  2.6303  2.000  
26  0.037  0.032  27.776  0.333  -0.033  -0.027  2.7737  2.000  
25  0.062  0.077  27.377  0.363  0.006  0.003  2.7776  2.000  
26  0.030  -0.000  27.666  0.366  0.003  0.003  2.7600  2.000  
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27  0.006  -0.033  27.697  0.357  -0.027  -0.027  2.7767  2.000  
27  -0.003  -0.007  27.500  0.633  -0.027  -0.027  2.9733  2.000  
29  0.036  0.025  27.670  0.677  -0.003  -0.003  2.9759  2.000  
30  0.026  0.006  27.763  0.537  -0.030  -0.032  3.3602  2.000  
32  -0.030  -0.036  27.796  0.593  -0.035  -0.036  3.6530  2.000  
33  0.000  -0.002  27.796  0.653  -0.023  -0.023  3.5056  2.000  
33  -0.030  -0.029  29.276  0.692  0.073  0.073  6.6622  2.000  
36  -0.039  -0.055  29.672  0.725  0.079  0.077  7.2667  2.000  
  
Table 1 and 3 present the regression results which shows that there is negative statistically 
significant relation between short term debt and long term debt. Furthermore, the coefficients 
of long term debt variables are close to -1 and statistically insignificantly different from -1 
with respective t-statistics of 1.73 and 1.55 respectively. Our analysis is based on large 
sample with 389 observations. The results also show that the null hypothesis is rejected and 
negative unit proportional impact is present. Results acknowledge that there is rise in long 
term debt proportionately compensated by a fall in short term debt.  
In both regression, conditional homoscedasticity is failed to be rejected. Serial correlation in 
the regression residuals from the regression in table 1 indicate a weak seasonal effect which 
dissipates in long and short lags. No seasonable pattern in serial correlation is found as 
presented in table 3 and table 4. The two stage least square method which we used minimizes 
the adverse effects of a simultaneity bias.  
In table 5 and 7, two stage least square regressions are performed. The slope coefficients on 
respectively net local debt and on gross local debt are expected to be negative and near to -1. 
These coefficients turned out to be -1.75 for the net local debt regression and -1.10 for the 
gross local debt. However, the p value is greater than 0.05 which means that both variables 
turned out to be statistically insignificant.  
These results indicate that as reduction occurs in local debt, whether gross or net, it bring 
increase in foreign currency based debt. Thus, it can be concluded that there is history of 
continuous swap of local debt replacing the foreign debt. Other studies also noticed this 
phenomena such as Credit Libanais (3016).  
Based on the diagnostic data, we can observe one anomaly whereas the GLD producing 
white noise residuals, as the residuals of the first regression suffers from severe serial 
correlation after two lags. While, efficiency is lost because of serial correlation, the unbiased 
coefficient are found to be good. 
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 Table 5  
3SLS of the relation between foreign currency debt (TDFC) and Net Local Debt (NLD) term 
debt (restructuring)  
 Dependent Variable: (LOG(TDFC))  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 2885M03 3028M03  
Included observations: 378 after adjustments  
Instrument specification: TDFC(-2)  NLD(-2) (R-LBP)(-2) R-$(-2) Constant 
added to instrument list  
 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.  
C  -0.086330  0.027377  -5.255075  0.0000  
LOG(NLD)  -2.758868  0.563745  -3.236778  0.0028  
LOG(R-LBP)  0.057066  0.020364  5.600336  0.0000  
R-squared  0.338667  Mean dependent variable  0.023575  
Adjusted R-squared  0.336070  S.D. dependent variable  0.037735  
S.E. of regression  0.036307  Sum squared residuals  0.334673  
F-statistic  27.55608  Durbin-Watson statistic  3.222325  
P-value: F-statistic  0.000000  Second-Stage SSR  0.380826  
J-statistic  3.832366  Instrument rank  5  
P-value: J-statistic  0.330833        
Notes: NLD is Net Local Debt; TDFC is Total Debt in Foreign Currency; R-LBP is the 
domestic interest rate; R-$ is the US dollar foreign interest rate; and CI is the Coincident 
Indicator. LOG stands for the natural logarithm.  is the firstdifference operator.  
  
Table 6  
Ljung-Box Q-statistics: Econometric diagnostics of the regression in the previous table 
   On residuals  On residuals squared  
lag  AC  PAC  Q-Stat  P-value  AC  PAC  Q-stat  P-value  
2  -0.062  -0.062  2.0675  0.502  0.056  0.056  0.5628  0.557  
5  0.055  0.052  2.7677  0.578  -0.055  -0.055  0.6652  0.755  
5  0.285  0.270  22.757  0.008  0.057  0.057  2.0658  0.770  
4  0.055  0.055  25.055  0.027  0.026  0.020  2.2066  0.876  
5  0.265  0.256  28.076  0.005  -0.056  -0.055  2.5822  0.757  
6  0.075  0.078  50.575  0.005  0.055  0.055  2.6665  0.765  
7  0.080  0.070  55.500  0.005  -0.005  -0.006  2.6652  0.786  
8  -0.005  -0.055  55.505  0.006  -0.056  -0.052  2.6552  0.770  
7  0.227  0.075  56.755  0.005  0.076  0.077  5.5655  0.768  
20  0.085  0.056  58.757  0.002  0.066  0.056  5.7565  0.767  
22  0.078  0.070  50.777  0.002  -0.055  -0.057  6.5567  0.765  
25  0.070  0.066  55.557  0.002  -0.025  -0.025  6.5028  0.777  
25  0.077  0.060  55.255  0.002  -0.026  -0.052  6.5585  0.787  
24  0.087  0.067  57.665  0.002  0.006  0.020  6.5657  0.775  
25  0.058  0.026  58.670  0.002  -0.025  -0.026  6.6252  0.776  
26  0.075  0.022  60.076  0.002  0.057  0.058  6.8657  0.776  
27  0.055  -0.027  60.605  0.002  0.075  0.076  6.6666  0.787  
28  0.077  0.057  65.565  0.002  0.256  0.250  25.065  0.865  
27  0.057  0.026  65.662  0.002  -0.058  -0.062  25.586  0.875  
50  0.050  0.026  66.558  0.002  -0.028  -0.025  25.585  0.705  
   On residuals    On residuals squared   
lag  AC  PAC  Q-Stat  P-value  AC  PAC  Q-stat  P-value  
52  0.077  0.052  66.077  0.002  -0.056  -0.055  25.587  0.755  
55  0.052  0.050  66.870  0.005  -0.052  -0.028  25.750  0.740  
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55  0.065  -0.006  67.686  0.005  0.057  0.065  25.265  0.748  
54  0.265  0.255  55.758  0.000  0.077  0.078  25.260  0.727  
  
Table 7  
3SLS of the relation between foreign currency debt (TDFC) and Gross Local Debt (NGLD) 
term debt (restructuring) 
 Dependent Variable: (LOG(TDFC))  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 2775M03 3027M03  
Included observations: 387 after adjustments  
Instrument specification: TDFC(-2)  GLD(-2) R-LBP(-2) R-$(-2) NLD(-2) Constant 
added to instrument list  
 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  P-value  
C  -0.075355  0.025355  -5.753303  0.0000  
(LOG(GLD))  -2.208583  0.375707  -3.777773  0.0055  
LOG(R-LBP)  0.058523  0.008078  5.755325  0.0000  
R-squared  0.255755  Mean dependent variable  0.023585  
Adjusted R-squared  0.257850  S.D. dependent variable  0.038835  
S.E. of regression  0.035807  Sum squared residuals  0.366687  
F-statistic  28.78853  Durbin-Watson statistic  3.257572  
P-value: F-statistic  0.000000  Second-Stage SSR  0.370833  
J-statistic  5.085222  Instrument rank  6  
P-value: J-statistic  0.287283        
Notes: GLD is Gross Local Debt; LTLD is Long Term Local Debt; R-LBP is the domestic 
interest rate; R-$ is the US dollar foreign interest rate; and CI is the Coincident Indicator. 
LOG stands for the natural logarithm.  is the firstdifference operator.  
  
Table 8  
Ljung-Box Q-statistics 
   On residuals  On residuals squared  
lag  AC  PAC  Q-Stat  P-value  AC  PAC  Q-stat  P-value  
2  -0.082  -0.082  2.8288  0.288  -0.020  -0.020  0.0383  0.868  
3  -0.080  -0.088  4.3834  0.228  0.002  0.000  0.0383  0.886  
3  -0.023  -0.038  4.3330  0.338  0.038  0.038  0.3883  0.866  
4  0.033  0.022  4.4825  0.344  0.008  0.008  0.3880  0.882  
5  0.038  0.038  4.8482  0.448  0.038  0.038  0.5252  0.883  
6  -0.038  -0.038  5.2358  0.538  0.088  0.088  3.3820  0.883  
6  0.020  0.020  5.2543  0.842  0.030  0.032  3.8485  0.826  
8  -0.083  -0.088  8.3288  0.823  -0.008  -0.020  3.8828  0.853  
8  -0.028  -0.033  8.4382  0.888  0.022  0.008  3.8085  0.865  
20  0.085  0.080  8.2283  0.828  0.083  0.080  4.3385  0.832  
22  0.088  0.088  8.8838  0.534  0.082  0.058  5.4508  0.806  
23  -0.080  -0.034  22.083  0.534  0.034  0.028  5.8333  0.834  
23  -0.008  0.008  22.080  0.804  -0.008  -0.024  5.8354  0.858  
24  0.088  0.088  23.348  0.500  0.038  0.034  5.8828  0.860  
25  0.002  0.008  23.348  0.588  -0.003  -0.008  5.8843  0.883  
26  0.082  0.088  24.832  0.530  0.085  0.052  8.2800  0.860  
26  0.028  0.045  25.038  0.583  0.080  0.088  8.8822  0.826  
28  0.238  0.288  30.884  0.382  0.088  0.200  23.882  0.822  
28  -0.008  0.044  30.882  0.338  0.005  0.008  23.888  0.855  
 Finance & Accounting Research Journal,   Aksoy & Dilek, pp. 12-21 Page 21 
 
30  -0.030  0.023  32.224  0.380  -0.024  -0.036  23.644  0.888  
32  0.080  0.088  33.668  0.308  0.002  -0.026  23.645  0.826  
33  0.002  0.034  33.668  0.365  -0.008  -0.036  23.663  0.840  
33  0.086  0.236  36.568  0.364  0.066  0.058  24.606  0.808  
34  -0.225  -0.068  30.664  0.262  0.036  0.023  24.833  0.836  
 
CONCLUSION 
There are separate definitions of restructuring and the rescheduling. In foreign context, they 
are associated with bankruptcy, possibility of default, and financial distress. In local context, 
the rescheduling of debt is about converging a swap of short term debt to long term debt. 
Furthermore, the restructuring is about swap of local debt to foreign debt known as Euro 
bonds. Market price is used for such transactions and function as reduction to service of the 
debt since foreign rates are seems to be lesser compare to the local one. An argument can be 
made that such swap can decrease the sovereign risk since domestic bonds are safer and can 
be redeemed by issuing currency; whereas, for Euro bonds, it cannot be done. But it is also 
showed in some international evidence that sovereign risk of local and foreign bonds are 
closely related to each other and with some modification, both are same. The paper shows 
evidence that swap transactions including restructuring and rescheduling were conducted at 
market price since 1990s. furthermore, the relationship is unit negative proportionality. In 
this study, simultaneity bias is overcome and results are robust.  
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